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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 14/04/2008 Accident number: 567 
Accident time: 11:40 Accident Date: 21/05/2007 
Where it occurred: Bazuriyah Village, 
Area 7-001 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 04/06/2007 
ID original source: 004/2007 Name of source: UNMAS 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: DPICM M77 
submunition 




Date record created:  Date  last modified: 14/04/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: UTM  712082/3681844 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate area marking (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
Accident report 
The reports for this accident were made available in February 2008 as a collection of files and 
pictures. Their conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has been 
lost. The substance of the reportd is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files 
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are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. The Board of Inquiry carried out by the MAC is 
followed by the demining group’s internal inquiry report. 
 
REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 004/2007 
BAC Accident that occurred in Area 7-001 (CBU 40), UTM 712082/36844 on the 21st May 
2007 in which a civilian was injured (now died as of 7th Jun 07). 
References: 
• Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) 
• International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
• [Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
• Map: UNIFIL  JENIMAP  
• MACC SL Mine / UXO information 
Introduction 
1.  In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC 
SL Programme Manager, [Name removed] and Lt. Col [Name removed], NDO 
Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on Monday 21st May, for an accident 
investigation Board of Inquiry (BOI).  The MACC SL board members are Capt. [Name 
removed], LAF QA Officer MACC SL, Lt [Name removed], LAF OPS Officer MACC SL and 
[Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL. 
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Accident that occurred on 
21st May 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining group] internal 
investigation report, statements from [Demining group]  personnel involved in the accident 
(Annex A), visits to and photographs from the accident site,  the accident is considered 
preventable. 
3. The [Demining group] investigation report was forwarded to the BOI on 23rd May 2007 and 
is attached at Annex B. The accident occurred at approx.1140hrs on the 21st May 2007 in 
Area 7-001 CBU 40 situated near the village of Bazuriyah, UTM  712082/3681844, additional 
information is: 
Date: 21st May 2007 
Time of Incident: 1200hrs approx [sic]. 
Location: Bazuriyah, Area 7-001, Lebanon 
Task: CBU-40, Task Dossier 7-001 
UTM of location of the munition: 712082/2681844 
Task Start / Finish Date: 28th February 07 to task not yet completed 
Reported by: Mr. [Name removed], Site Supervisor 
Reported to: Operations Department, MACC SL 
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1200hrs approx. 
MA Organisation POC: Mr. [Name removed], PM [Demining group] 
Investigation Date/Time: 21st May 07, 1300hrs  
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Investigation Location: Task CBU - 40 
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF QA Officer, Lt [Name removed], LAF 
Operations Officer and [Name removed], MACC SL C of QA. 
Explosive Ordnance Type: US M-77 Sub-munition  
Background 
4.  CBU 40 is part of Task Dossier 7-001 which is a cluster strike area from the recent conflict. 
The area is a mixture of buildings, house from the town of Bazuriyah and adjacent land used 
for growing orange and other citrus fruits. The area is contaminated with Israeli fired M77 sub-
munitions.      
5. [Demining group] commenced clearance at this site, 7-001, on 28th February 2007, but the 
task was [Demining group] internal suspended for two weeks while the Site Supervisor, Mr 
[Name removed] was on a programmed leave period. Up to the time of the accident 
[Demining group] BAC team 2 had been operational in CBU 40  for a total of ……x [Missing in 
original] operational days. 21 x M77s and 1 x 122mm fuse were located during operations, 
with a total of 20,850m2 visually searched and  59,377m2 sub-surface searched.   
6. The area where the accident occurred was adjacent to a new building construction site, 
portions of this area were used by the local population as a rubbish dump. In addition the area 
was within the residential housing area and was used as an access for the delivery of building 
materials to the adjacent construction site. It was reported at the time of the accident that a 
sub-munition had detonated due to rubble being disposed from the building site, on the 4th 
May 2007. There is no record of the MACC SL being informed of this incident, with no Ops or 
QA follow up investigation occurring.  Up to the day of the accident, the area where the 
accident occurred had been visual searched only and limited marking had occurred at this 
portion of the site, but was removed by the local population. CLOs had visited the local 
authorities, local population (around the site area) and the workers on the building site.  
Events leading up to the Accident 
7. On the morning of 21st May 2007 at approximately 0630hrs [Demining group] BAC Team 2 
re-deployed back to CBU 040 to start operations. At approximately 1140hrs, an uncontrolled 
explosion occurred at the building site adjacent to the rear of the BAC Team 2 CP, UTM 
712082/3681844, involving a civilian worker, Mr. [the Victim], who was delivering building 
material to the construction site. Mr. [the Victim] had reversed his truck on the area adjacent 
the construction site and had commenced to unload the vehicle. During this process Mr. [the 
Victim] kicked, stepped or dropped some building materials on a M77 sub-munition that was 
most likely sub-surface causing it to detonate.   
Events following the Accident 
8.  The [Demining group] Site Supervisor, Mr. [Name removed] immediately stopped search 
operations and deployed the team medic to provide emergency medical treatment and then 
transport [the Victim] by ambulance to the nearest hospital, at Jabal Amel, arriving at 1210hrs 
approx.  
BOI Post Accident Activities and General Observations 
9.   On arrival at the accident scene and after an initial reconnaissance by the Investigation 
Officers, it was ascertained that the BOI could gain safe access up to the accident scene 
without additional clearance being conducted.  
10.  On inspection of the accident scene on the 21st May 2007 the following general 
observations were established: 
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• There had been an uncontrolled detonation of an M77 Sub-munition, 
• The M77 was either partially or completely buried,   
• The area of the detonation was surface cleared and suspended pending sub-surface 
clearance, 
• The area was being used to store building materials for the adjacent building site, 
• New area marking materials, posts and tape,  had been erected at the site, 
• Evidence of previous marking items were around the general vicinity of the area, and 
• The vehicle had been removed from the site. 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
11. Task Dossier Area 7-001 was issued to [Demining group] in April 2007. The TD contains 
details of … x [Missing in original] CBU strikes. Up to the time of the accident a total area of 
80,215 m² (surface and sub-surface) of the area had been cleared, resulting in the disposal of 
a total number of 21 x Sub-Munitions.   
Geography and Weather 
12.   CBU 040 is located in a mixed urban, agriculture and citrus area. The ground where the 
accident occurred was hard and covered with rubbish and building materials.  
Site Layout and Marking 
13.   The site layout and minefield marking prior to the accident was in accordance with 
National TSGs and [Demining group] SOPs, however the marking around the area of the 
accident had been removed by the general public and replaced several times.  
Management, Supervision and Discipline 
14.   There are no reports of disciplinary action being taken against any [Demining group] 
personnel on CBU 40 to date. 
Quality Assurance 
15.  External QA was carried out by the MACC SL QA Section; the last External QA 
Evaluation on [Demining group] BAC Team 2 was conducted on 3rd May 2007,  Battle Area 
Clearance, (Form E), carried out by QA Officer [Name removed]; all evaluation results were 
acceptable.  
Communications and Reporting 
16.  Communications between CBU 40 and [Demining group] base location are maintained 
via the use of cell phone. On site communications between teams are also maintained via 
VHF handheld radios.  
17.   On the day of the accident, the site had proper and appropriate communications and 
managed to pass all relevant accident information back to [Demining group] base location, 
which in turn passed the information to the MACC SL in a timely manner.  
Medical Details 
18. [The Victim] suffered blast injuries to both feet and received head injuries. After the 
[Demining group] medic administered medical treatment and he was stabilised on-
site he was evacuated by road to Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre.   
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Details of Sub-Munitions Involved 
 19.  The M77 HE cluster bomb is commonly referred to among the Lebanese and Palestinian 
population as the “battery bomb” or “lighter” bomb because of its shape. There M77 HE 
grenades are dispensed from various sizes of projectiles, which are initiated my mechanical 
times fuses above the target areas to allow dispersion of the grenade. The M77 has a white 
nylon ribbon which when pulled or touched can detonate. Shortly after ejection from the 
projectile, artillery shell or various size of container or dispenser, the M77 HE grenade arms 
due to the rotation of the white nylon ribbon. This ribbon also acts as stabilizing tail to orient 
the cone of the grenade towards the target. Upon impact a charge in the grenade launched 
downward to penetrate armour while the metal grenade body bursts into shrapnel-like 





20.  Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concludes the 
following: 
A M77 detonated after [the Victim] either stood, kicked or dropped building materials on the 
sub-munition.  
The accident occurred in a surface cleared area, 
1. The CASEVAC was conducted in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs, with the 
casualty given appropriate first aid and transported by ambulance to the nearest 
hospital in good time. 
2. There was an uncontrolled detonation most likely of a M77 that occurred on the 4th 
May 2007 that was not reported to the MACC. 
3. The area where the accident occurred had been marked with pickets and tape but 
this was removed or damaged and not been replaced or maintained either during the 
internal suspension and the clearance of the CBU task.  
4. The local population had not adhered to warnings of the danger of this area, by CLOs 
[Community Liaison Officers].  
Recommendations 
21.  The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions: 
• The area of the accident is to sub-surface cleared, immediately. 
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• [Deming group] is to report all uncontrolled detonations, at all CBU tasks and any 
related detonations, to the MACC SL to allow correct follow up investigations and 
operational clearance plan adjustments to be made. Revise all [Demining group] 
operational staff and office personnel in this requirement. 
• [Demining group] is to maintain making/warning materials during the clearance 
process and during periods of internal suspensions or when period of leave or stand-
down by the supervisor. 
• Contact the relevant NDO/MACC SL Operations Officer to address the movement of 
public in urban areas to adjust clearance plans if required.  
Signed: C/QA Officer , MACC SL ; LAF QA Officer , NDO/MACC SL  
4th June May 07 
Site Photographs 
 
[Point of detonation was beneath the pile of reinforcing bar.] 
 
[The reinforcing bar is in the centre of this picture near to the building.] 
 
Internal [Demining group] accident report 
INVESTIGATION REPORT ON A M77 SUB-MUNITION  ACCIDENT AT CBU 040, AREA 7-
001. Al Bazuriyah 
The incident occurred in Area 7001 (CBU 040), UTM 0712082  3681844 on the 21st May 
2007, on an active BAC site. One M77 Sub-Munition was detonated by a construction worker 
whilst unloading a truck containing building materials. 
References: 
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Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
[Demining group] Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
Introduction 
In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), and [Demining 
group] Standing Operating Procedures SOPs the Programme Manager of [Demining group], 
Mr. [Name removed] instructed that an internal investigation into the above incident be carried 
out.   
This Report will form part of the NDO / MACC SL report into the incident which occurred on 
the 21st may 2007.  The initial investigation by [Demining group] investigation team 
established that: The incident is considered not preventable. 
Relevant facts 
Date: 21st May 2007 
Time of Incident: 11:40h approximately. 
Location: Al Bazuriyah, Lebanon 
Task: CBU-040, Task Dossier 7-001 
UTM of location of the munition: 0712082  3681844 
Task Start / Finish Date: 28th February 2007 Task ongoing. 
Reported by: Mr. [Name removed] 
Reported to: QA Department, MACC SL 
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 12:00hrs approx. 
MA Organisation POC: Mr. [Name removed] 
Investigation Date/Time: 21tst May 2007, 12:30hrs  
Investigation Location: Task CBU -040 
Investigation Team: Mr [Name removed], [Name removed], Programme manager/Head of 
Mission (HoM) 
Explosive Ordnance Type: US M -77 Sub-munition  
Background 
CBU 040 forms part of task Dossier 7-001 issued to [Demining group] for BAC clearance as 
part of the sub-munitions clearance programme in South Lebanon. CBU 040 is an active 
clearance site.  According to [Demining group] site files for the task, the area where the 
incident occurred, has been surface cleared only in accordance the TSGs and [Demining 
group] SOP, to reduce the immediate risk posed by cluster munitions.  The intension for CBU 
040, as per the clearance plan, is to return to this area once higher priority areas have been 
cleared sub-surface.  The Clearance mythology for CBU 040 is to clear all, none hard 
standing contaminated areas, sub-surface.   
Events leading up to the Incident 
According to witness reports, See Annex D, on the morning of the 21st May 2007 at 
approximately 11:30, an explosion occurred behind the CP of CBU 040.  Evidence at the site 
of the incident and from eye witnesses indicated that the construction worker either stepped 
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or dropped a length of reinforcing bar on an obscured cluster bomb causing it to high order 
detonate.   
Events following the Incident 
The first [Demining group] staff member to arrive at the scene of the incident reported that a 
group of people was surrounding one casualty laying on the ground.  Shortly after the site 
medic arrived at the scene and, assisted by one BAC operator, approached the casualty to 
administer first aid. During the period the casualty was receiving first aid, and up to the point 
when the casualty was removed to hospital, the team leader of bravo team was coordinating 
at the incident site and the supervisor, [Name removed], was at the CP from where he was in 
overall command and control of the incident. 
The site supervisor immediately contacted [Demining group] Ops room by cell phone to 
inform the Programme Manager Mr [Name removed].  In addition [Name removed] also 
contacted [Name removed] at MACC OPS to report the location and circumstances relating to 
the incident.  Immediately the programme manager went to the incident location to assist in 
the initial investigation. 
Post Incident Activities and General Observations 
On arrival at the incident site, the programme manager accompanied the site supervisor 
attended the site.  The site was accessed along a section of hard standing.  From the 
evidence on the ground and from information contained within the site file is seems likely that 
the injuries sustained by the casualty were from an M77 Sub-munition. 
Observations at the site also revealed the following: 
• The area in which the suspected sub-munition had detonated would seem to indicate 
that the munition was sub-surface 
• A quantity of concrete reinforcing bar was directly adjacent to the site of the 
explosion. 
• The site of the explosion was also contaminated by other construction and general 
debris. 
Geography and Weather 
CBU 040 is located the village of Al Bazuriyah. The land is primarily a waste/dumping area 
adjacent to an ongoing construction site and residential dwellings.  
Conclusions 
Based on the investigation, site documentation and site visit by the PM and the Site 
Supervisor the following conclusion can be drawn: 
• The incident was probably the result of the victim either stepping on the sub-munition 
or dropping a length of reinforcing bar on to it. 
• The location of the sub-munitions was identified as  in an area that surface clearance 
had taken place      
• The sub-munitions was in a designated danger area 
• The sub-munition was probably sub-surface or obscured by building debris. 
• Dangerous area making pickets and mine tape have been removed on numerous 




The following recommendations are based on the [Demining group] internal investigation: 
• [Demining group] CLO, supported by MACC Ops CLO should continue to warn local 
residents that the areas has been surface cleared only, and still poses a dangerous to 
local residents. 
• Sub-surface clearance of the area is carried out as a priority.  
• Appropriate warning signs and mine furniture is erected and checked daily by 
clearance teams. 
Signed: Programme Manager/Head of Mission;  Site Supervisor, [Demining group] I
 BAC team  
21st May 2007 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 741 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 40 Gender: Male 
Status: civilian  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: None 
Protection issued: None Protection used: None 
 









COMMENT: See Medical report 
 
Medical report 
An IMSMA report confirmed that the victim was male and born in 1967. The time of the 
accident was recorded as 11:38. 
• The IMSMA sketches record: 
• Loss of eyesight right side 
• Loss of foot/toes, left side. 
• Other injuries to head, chest, abdomen and upper limbs. 
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The victim went to the accident place because “is easy for him to lift the construction 
materials.”  
The area where the accident happened was not marked. 
The victim died on 7th June 2007, 17 days after the accident. 
 
Statements 
Statement 1: TEAM 2, Team Leader 
On 21-5-2007 around 11:30 while I was having my lunch in the control point which is located 
in a building close to the main road and next to the old municipality building I heard an 
explosion and directly people screaming and shouting saying that a civilian was injured. 
Immediately, I ran to the accident place and I saw from a distance lot people and one person 
laying on the ground and [Demining group]'s medic giving him the medical support and beside 
him one operator. Quickly, I started to ask the people to leave the accident area and give the 
medic a space to do his job but the people did not respond. Meanwhile, the ambulance was 
ready to transport the victim to the hospital. After the medic finished his job, he put the 
casualty on the spin board and then holds him to the vehicle with the assistant of the civil 
defence guys. 
Regarding the accident place or land, it was cleared visually and the reason why it was not 
cleared instrumentally is because of the nature of the land and because it is close to a 
construction project and therefore it is full of metals note that it is a hard land to clear due to 
many slopes inside especially between the accident place and the building there. 
We reported to the municipality that we still need to work in that area and put around that area 
pickets and tapes but people did not respond and the construction project continued. 
 
Statement 2: Team 2 QC 
AT 11:40, I was doing some work in the field when I heard an explosion. Directly I ran to the 
explosion place because I assumed that it took place in our operation area. When I got there I 
did what I should do. There were around 20 people around someone laying on the ground. I 
started asking the people to leave the place since it is a dangerous area. Meanwhile the 
medic was giving medical support to the casualty. Later and after few minutes an ambulance 
came and took the casualty to the hospital. I kept asking the people to stay away from the 
dangerous area. 
 
Statement 3: Team 2, Operator 
During lunch hour, I was having my meal close to the control point and after that I went to the 
neighbours to get some water and suddenly I heard an explosion and  I look behind me and I 
saw a man laying on the ground. Quickly I went down to the control point looking for the team 
leader and the medic. They both came to the accident place and the medic stared to give 
medical support for the casualty and later on an ambulance took the casualty to the hospital. 
 
Statement 4: Team 3, Operator 
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On the 21- 5-2007 and at 11:35, I was working on putting out a fire across the control point, I 
heard an explosion and people screaming. I thought that some one from our team was 
injured. I ran to the accident place and I saw the casualty on the ground and lot of people 




Marking had been placed in the area and removed by local people during a stand-down. 
When the deminers returned, it seems that the marking was not replaced. Statements raise 
doubts whether there was ever any intention to clear that area using sub-surface detectors. 
Whether or not this was the case, questions about the suitability of the procedures in place 
arise. The procedure of carrying out a surface check followed by a later sub-surface 
clearance puts deminers at risk from buried ordnance and may also give civilians a false 
confidence that the area has been cleared when it has not. The photograph of the accident 
site shows a shallow crater indicating that the device was not deeply buried and may have 
been close to (or on) the surface. 
Lack of control after the accident meant that civilians crowded around on a known hazardous 
area. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
demining group did not ensure that the hazardous area was clearly marked. The presence of 
buildings materials inside the area indicated that local people were using the area, but nothing 
was done to prevent this. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control 
inadequacy” because the procedures to keep civilians out of working areas do not seem to 
have been in place, or were not enforced. 
There had been a previous uncontrolled detonation (4th May) that had not been reported to 
the MAC, which implies that the Demining group did not take the MAC’s requirement to report 
unintended detonations seriously. Had it been reported, it is possible that the Community 
Liaison Teams might have used that as evidence and prevented the Victim entering the work 
area while it was clearly still hazardous. 
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